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INTRODUCTION
Bargaining sets and related solution concepts for coalitional games have Ž Ž . . been studied intensively for a comprehensive survey see Maschler 1992 .
The first notions of a bargaining set for a cooperative game were Ž . Ž . introduced by Aumann and Maschler 1964 . Mas-Colell 1989 proposed a new variant of a bargaining set. One of the advantages of the Mas-Colell bargaining set is that it can be defined for games with a continuum of Ž . players. Mas-Colell 1989 showed that in atomless pure exchange economies his bargaining set coincides with the set of competitive equilibria. For such economies, or more generally for games with a non-empty core, the non-emptiness of the bargaining set is automatic, since, by definition, it contains the core. But for games with an empty core, the question of the non-emptiness of the bargaining set arises, and has been studied in the literature. For coalitional games with a finite set of players, the Mas-Colell bargaining set contains the prekernel and is therefore non-empty.
The least core is a core-like non-empty-valued solution concept for Ž . coalitional games which was introduced by Maschler et al. 1979 , who studied its relation to the kernel and the nucleolus. In the present work we show that the least core of a coalitional game with a finite set of players is always contained in the Mas-Colell bargaining set. We give an example which shows that this does not hold for the classical bargaining set. We then extend this result to coalitional games with a measurable set of players in which the worth of the grand coalition is at least that of any other coalition in the game. Since the least core is always non-empty, we thereby obtain an existence theorem for the Mas-Colell bargaining set in games with a measurable space of players. It should be noted that this work is concerned only with TU games, and therefore our results do not bear upon the issue of non-emptiness of the Mas-Colell bargaining set in NTU games.
FINITE GAMES
In this section we prove that the Mas-Colell bargaining set contains the least core in any coalitional game with a finite set of players. Ž . Ž . A finite coalitional game, or simply a game, is a pair N, where Ä 4 N N s 1, . . . , n is the set of players and : 2 ª ᑬ is a function which Ž . N satisfies л s 0. The members of 2 , i.e., the subsets of N, are called Ž .
Ž . Ž . Ž . LC , is the intersection of all non-empty strong -cores of N, . Let Ž . Ž be the smallest such that C / л from here on we assume that . n G 2 , i.e., s min max S y x S .
Ž .
Ž . Ž .
Ž . Then LC s C . The least core was introduced in Maschler et al. Maschler et al. 1979 .
We now proceed to the definition of the Mas-Colell bargaining set, Ž . introduced in Mas-Colell 1989 .
Ž . Let x be a preimputation for the game N, and let A :
, and the following two conditions are satisfied:
Ž . with at least one strict inequality in 2.1 or 2.2 .
Ž . An objection A, y to x is justified if there is no counter-objection to it. Ž . Ž . The Mas-Colell bargaining set of the game N, , denoted by MB , is the Ž . set of all preimputations for N, to which there is no justified objection.
Ž . Ž . Note that C : MB . Ž . Ž . Two games N, and N, w are strategically equi¨alent if there exist Ž . Mas-Colell 1989 pointed out that in finite coalitional games the pre-Ž kernel is always contained in his bargaining set for a proof see Proposition Ž .. 3.2 in Vohra 1991 . Since the prekernel is non-empty, so is the Mas-Colell bargaining set. The proof of Theorem A provides an alternative elementary proof for the existence of the Mas-Colell bargaining set in finite games, and as we shall see in Section 3, it can be extended under additional mild conditions to infinite games, where no appropriate defini-Ž tion is known for the prekernel except for games with a countable set of . players . 
INFINITE GAMES
The purpose of this section is to extend Theorem A to games with an infinite set of players.
Ž . Let T, ⌺ be a measurable space, i.e., T is a set and ⌺ is a -field of subsets of T. The members of T are the players and those of ⌺ are the Ž . coalitions. A coalitional game on T, ⌺ is a bounded function : ⌺ ª ᑬ Ž . with л s 0. Let ba be the space of all bounded finitely additive Ž . measures on T, ⌺ with the variation norm. It is well known that ba is the norm dual of the space of all bounded Borel-measurable functions on Ž . T, ⌺ . A preimputation for the game is a member x of ba which Ž . Ž . satisfies x T s T . Like in the finite case we denote the set of all U Ž . preimputations for by I . Ž . The core and the strong -core of for any real number are defined Ä Ž .< 4 as in the finite case. Since the family C g ᑬ is an increasing family of weak U -compact sets, by the finite intersection property the intersection of all non-empty strong -cores is non-empty. This intersection is the least Ž . core of and as in the finite case is denoted by LC . Let
Then it is easy to see that is finite, the infimum is attained, and
Ž
. The next definition is taken from Einy et al. 1996 ; it extends the definition of the Mas-Colell bargaining set to infinite games.
Ž . This is a weak version of 2.3 , but it will allow us to adapt the proof of Theorem A to the current context. Let ␣, ␤ be chosen as in the proof of Theorem A. For each S g ⌺ let
Ž . Ž . Then z T s T , and the same chain of inequalities as in the proof of Ž . Ž . Ä 4 Theorem A shows that B y z B F for every B g ⌺ _ л, T . We
Ž .. show that sup S y z S -and this will contradict the def- Remark 3.1. It is clear from the proof of Theorem A that the condition Ž . Ž . '' T G S for every non-empty S g ⌺'' may be replaced by condition Ž .
Ž . 3.4 . Moreover, even if does not satisfy 3.4 , it suffices that is strategically equivalent to a game which satisfies this condition. We note that any finite game is strategically equivalent to a game which satisfies this condition, and this explains why no condition was needed in the finite case.
Remark 3.2. Once we have an existence result for the Mas-Colell bargaining set, it is natural to ask whether the measure whose existence is asserted may be required to satisfy some additional desirable properties. Ž We mention two facts that we have proved in this respect omitting the . precise definitions and the proofs . If we replace the assumption of Theorem B by the stronger, but quite standard, assumption that is Ž . non-negative-valued and superadditive, then we can show that MB Ž . contains an imputation rather than just a preimputation . If, in addition to the above, we assume that is absolutely continuous with respect to some Ž . Ž . non-negative countably additive measure on T, ⌺ , then MB contains a countably additive imputation.
. Note. Shimomura 1997 , in a paper that appeared after this work was submitted for publication, proved a resultᎏhis Theorem 1ᎏthat is related to our Theorem A. Using the terminology defined there, his theorem asserts that the individually rational quasicore is contained in the MasColell bargaining set for every finite TU game satisfying grand coalition zero monotonicity. The individually rational quasicore differs only slightly from the least core: it is defined in essentially the same way, but with respect to imputations rather than preimputations. There is, however, an important difference in the definitions of the Mas-Colell bargaining set. Contrary to the standard definition that we use here, Shimomura requires that an objection be strictly beneficial to all the members of the objecting Ž . coalition that is, y ) x for all i g A . This may result in the bargaining 
. consists of the single point , , , whereas according to Shimomura's 3 3 3 definition it is the union of three line segments joining this point to the Shimomura's result weaker than ours.
